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Regular version of the site

Pre-defense of the dissertation «Social Status and Information Transmission in Experimental Games» by Oxana Bondarenko

The pre-defense of Oksana Bondarenko's dissertation «Social Status and Information Transmission in Experimental Games»  took place at the International Laboratory for Experimental and Behavioural Economics within the framework of the regular scientific seminar.
Scientific adviser: Dr. Alexey Zakharov, Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor.

Abstract:  This work studies how social status and other personal characteristics affect social learning. In a dyadic experimental game, individuals make repeated attempts to guess the underlying state of the world. Socioeconomic status, subjective social status, leadership traits, social capital and other characteristics are measured by a set of questions while risk aversion is elicited by an incentivized task. Asymmetric social status is also induced by a dictator game. The results show that people with high subjective social status rely less on observed choices of other subjects and put more weight on private information. People with lower risk aversion and with more pronounced leadership traits are also less likely to learn from the actions of others. (Resume dissertation)
The study was recommended by the scientific commission for the defence of degree of Candidate of Economic Sciences at the Higher School of Economics. 

Congratulations to our colleague!
For join the seminar, please, contact Tatiana Libenson via tlibenson@hse.ru

Seminar schedule on https://epee.hse.ru/en/research_seminar/2020_2021