Research Seminar

Ekaterina Sinyakova (Moscow State University)

Abstract:

When people are faced with unrelated tasks, relative performance feedback after one of them is uninformative in terms of the second task. Success or failure in the first task should not be considered when predicting the outcome of the second one. Nevertheless, literature shows that subjects do take it into account. Two possible explanations are the "hot hand" fallacy (subjects expect another win after the first one) and "general ability" (subjects do not take into account specific abilities and believe they are better/worse than others in general). Our project aims to distinguish between these explanations and conduct a two-day experiment to avoid the "hot hand" fallacy. We intend not only to compare the subjects' stated confidence, but also to examine how feedback affects their efforts and willingness to compete.

Marina V. Ryzhkova (professor, Tomsk State University, Tomsk Polytechnic University)

Elmira R. Kashapova (Junior Research Fellow, Tomsk State University; senior Lecturer, Tomsk Polytechnic University)

Abstract:

Previously, we conducted laboratory economic experiments, and a program design simulating “financial pyramids” was developed. In 2023 the experiments were carried out in Tomsk and Vladivostok. Now we will improve the design of the program in order to bring the appearance and features closer to existing real digital pyramids. To develop a new design, the behavioral characteristics of the sites of active and closed financial pyramids were analyzed.

At the seminar we would like to discuss the options for nudges (sludges) that can push (restrain) a non-professional investor in the process of investment decisions to participate in projects such as financial pyramids.

The purpose of the seminar is to discuss the configuration and specific implementation of factors for attracting non-professional investors to participate in schemes with characteristics of a financial pyramid in the digital environment. As a result, our research is aimed at developing the fundamentals of countering social engineering in a game format.

Nadezhda Markova (NRU HSE-St. Petersburg),

Diana Pavlova (NRU HSE-St. Petersburg)

Abstract:
Given the importance of prosocial behaviour in the society, this paper investigates the impact of peer choice on individual decision-making in the dictator game among 4-7-year-old children. A theoretical framework is developed, and an experiment is conducted with two groups of children, one playing the standard dictator game with allocation, and the other being informed of a peer's decision before playing. We hypothesize that observing a prosocial decision from a peer will encourage the decision-maker to make a similar choice. We also explore the children's perception of others' norms using a Krupka & Weber's (2013) approach adopted to young children. We show that equal distribution is a norm among children. 

Marina V. Ryzhkova (professor, Tomsk State University, Tomsk Polytechnic University)

Elmira R. Kashapova (Junior Research Fellow, Tomsk State University; senior Lecturer, Tomsk Polytechnic University)

Abstract:

The digital transformation of the financial market contributes to an increase in the availability of financial services, which leads to an increase in the number of non-professional investors. On the one hand, it expands the possibilities of attracting free funds to the financial markets, on the other hand, it gives rise to increased volatility and risks associated with mass trading of assets by market agents who do not have any information, knowledge, or experience. And financial scammers use it. At the seminar our research group wants to discuss the option of organizing financial pyramids in laboratory economic experiment. Instrumental variables are factors that can push/nudge (restrain/sludge) a non-professional investor to participate in Ponzi schemes. The goal is to determine the factors for attracting non-professional investors to participate in digital Ponzi schemes.

Student project presentation seminar:

Nikolai Sapega (NRU HSE, ICEF BSc 4th year student)

Konstantin Sidyaking (NRU HSE, ICEF BSc 4th year student)

«How corruption experience  affects affected when they get power?»                                                    

«Analysis of agents' knowledge about each other's characteristics as a determinant of trust?»

Mikhail Freer (University of Essex, presenter)

Co – authors: Christian Basteck (WZB), Ahrash Dianat (University of Essex)

Abstract: Sincere voting fails to deliver social optimum, especially in polarized societies and societies with divided majorities. In response to the failure of sincere voting, there have been several attempts at coordinated voting (e.g., tactical voting in the UK).  However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful due to natural constraints on voters’ cognitive abilities.  For strategic voting to be successful, each voter must use a correct model of other voters’ behavior.  The construction of such models requires the formation of higher-order beliefs. In this paper, we propose a class of simple voting rules, that  (1) allow voters to have a limited belief hierarchy,  (2) robust to ad hoc assumptions about the behavior of other voters, and (3) guarantee that the equilibrium outcome is optimal. We bring these voting mechanisms to the diagnostics test in the lab.

Abstract: The initial design and results of the first pilot of this study, conducted in Tomsk, were presented at the 2nd Pacific School of Experimental Economics in September 2022. After discussion, the design of the experiment was changed and the second pilot was conducted, but already in Kazan. We present the results of the modified study design at the current seminar in Experimental Economics.
The modified hypotheses concerned the distribution of time between work, household duties, and leisure. At the same time, the employee could choose different intensities of the working regime: “work for money” or “lazy schedule”. The experimental group differed from the control group by an increase in the intensity of labor tasks. In the design of the experiment, household duties were introduced as an obligatory element to be done.
The purpose of the study is to test the features of decision-making on the distribution of time between different human activities in a situation of increasing cognitive load. The results of the study will help to understand the behavioral strategies of employees with irregular schedules that blur the boundaries between working and leisure time, for which the need for effective time management is relevant.

Abstract:  By means of a laboratory economic experiment implemented in Khorog (Tajikistan) we investigate the (in)consistency among different aspects of social norms such as empirical expectations, normative expectations, and conditionality of behaviour upon expectations, taking the example of harassment bribery, where public officials have a possibility to harass a bribe from a citizen in order to provide a prize he is entitled to. We measure actual behaviour, normative and empirical expectations and then we manipulate empirical expectations and analyse whether harassment behaviour is conditional upon them. Moreover, we check conditionality of normative expectations upon empirical expectations. Experiment shows that vast majority of “officials” harass bribes and “citizens” agree to pay them. Empirical expectations of “officials” about mean bribes are consistent with actual behaviour, however participants underestimate actual prevalence of corrupt behaviour. On average participants consider that it is socially appropriate to demand and pay relatively small amounts of bribes. At the same time participants consider greater amounts of bribes demanded and paid more socially inappropriate. Moreover, the experiment provided the evidence of conditionality of “officials” behaviour upon empirical expectations, but there are no robust and consistent results on conditionality of “citizens” behaviour. Novel part of the experiment demonstrates conditionality of normative expectations upon empirical expectations. Results from this study will help policymakers to develop effective anti-corruption policies.

Tatiana Zhuravleva (NRU HSE)

"Inconsistent behaviour and beliefs in framed ultimatum game: evidence from Tajikistan"

Abstract: We plan to conduct a laboratory experiment in Khorog, Tajikistan with an aim to investigate the (in)consistency among different aspects of social norms such as actual behaviour, descriptive norms, empirical expectations, normative expectations and conditionality of behaviour upon empirical and normative expectations, taking the example of harassment bribery game, where the first player called "public official" propose the particular money transaction (or deal) to the second player called "citizen" in order to provide a prize he is entitled to. We measure separately descriptive and prescriptive norms and empirical expectations and then we manipulate empirical and normative expectations and analyse whether exaction behaviour is conditional upon them. Results from this study will help policymakers to develop effective nudges towards unfair behaviour.

Pre-defence of term papers:

Kirill Afanasev (HSE), Tatiana Zhuravleva (HSE)

Abstract: The research project is aimed to study the role of social norms in corruptive behaviour using the specific case of harassment bribery, where public officials have a possibility to harass a bribe from a citizen in order to provide a service he is entitled to. Golofast (2021) has found that normative expectations are not consistent with observed behaviour. People believe that harassment of a bribe is considered to be unacceptable by society but public officials still harass and citizens expect them to get involved into this type of corruption. At the same time we do not observe the normative consensus about paying or rejecting a harassed bribe. In the current study we plan to manipulate expectations and analyze whether harassment behavior is conditional upon empirical and normative expectations. Expectations are going to be shifted by anchors – hypothetical results of the harassment bribery experiment and imaginary survey on normative acceptance.

"People Prefer Moral Discretion to Algorithms: Algorithm Aversion Beyond Intransparency" - joint work with Matthias Uhl and Johanna Jauernig

“The Formation of Physician Altruism” - joint work with Arthur E. Attema, Matteo M. Galizzi, Mona Groß, Yassin Karay, Olivier L’Haridon, Daniel Wiesen

Abstract: We study how patient-regarding altruism is formed by medical education. We structurally estimate altruistic preferences using experimental data from a large sample of medical students (N=733) in Germany at different stages in their studies. The estimates reveal substantial heterogeneity in altruistic preferences of medical students. Patient-regarding altruism is highest for freshmen, significantly declines for students in the course of medical studies, and tends to increase again for last year students, who assist in clinical practice. Also, patient-regarding altruism is higher for females and positively associated to general altruism. Altruistic medical students have lower income expectations and are more likely to choose surgery and pediatrics as their preferred specialty.