Publications

We set up a laboratory experiment to investigate systematically how varying the magnitude of outside options—the payoffs that materialize in case of a bargaining breakdown—of proposers and responders influences players’ demands and game outcomes (rejection rates, payoffs, efficiency) in ultimatum bargaining. We find that proposers as well as responders gradually increase their demands when their respective outside option increases. Rejections become more likely when the asymmetry in the players’ outside options is large. Generally, the predominance of the equal split decreases with increasing outside options. From a theoretical benchmark perspective we find low predictive power of equilibria based on self-regarding preferences or inequity aversion. However, proposers and responders seem to be guided by the equity principle while they apply equity rules inconsistently and self-servingly.

Dishonest behavior significantly increases the cost of medical care provision. Upcoding of patients is a common form of fraud to attract higher reimbursements. Imposing audit mechanisms including fines to curtail upcoding is widely discussed among health care policy-makers. How audits and fines affect individual health care providers' behavior is empirically not well understood. To provide new evidence on fraudulent behavior in health care, we analyze the effect of a random audit including fines on individuals' honesty by means of a novel controlled behavioral experiment framed in a neonatal care context. Prevalent dishonest behavior declines significantly when audits and fines are introduced. The effect is driven by a reduction in upcoding when being detectable. Yet, upcoding increases when not being detectable as fraudulent. We find evidence that individual characteristics (gender, medical background, and integrity) are related to dishonest behavior. Policy implications are discussed.

The degree of individual manipulability of majoritarian aggregation procedures is evaluated for the case of one-dimensional positioning of alternatives and agents. The calculation of the degree of manipulability is performed for 3-5 alternatives. We find that the group of rules dominates all others in terms of the lowest share of all manipulable profiles, and for some extensions gives even the zero level manipulability.

The paper is focused on the history and modern practices of creating and applying interactive exploratory objects and worlds that provoke curiosity in the individual and require exploration and experimentation to learn them and to achieve practical goals. The development, use and demonstration of a wide range of exploratory objects (play, educational, psycho-diagnostic, etc.) in various fields reflects an increasingly wide spread belief: one of the basic human abilities that is needed now and will be in demand in the future is the ability to cope with novelty, including through active exploration and experimentation. Five interrelated directions for the development and popularization of exploratory objects are identified: science; educational practice; assessment; game practices; and literature, art, official and unofficial journalism. Parameters of specially developed interactive exploratory objects and worlds in the context of preparing for encounters with novelty and complexity are discussed. The triangle of tests of intelligence, creativity and exploratory behavior in the space of regulation – freedom is presented. Two types of motivational challenges when exploring new objects are described: exploration for the sake of the very process of cognition and exploration for the sake of desired practical effects. The issue of features of exploratory objects that stimulate posing and solving epistemic problems rather than pragmatic problems, and vice versa, is raised. In conclusion, possible reasons for the mass development and supply of exploratory objects and worlds are formulated.

The intransitive cycle of superiority is characterized by such binary relations between A, B, and C that A is superior to B, B is superior to C, and C is superior to A (i.e., A>B>C>A—in contrast with transitive relations A>B>C). The first part of the article presents a brief review of studies of intransitive cycles in various disciplines (mathematics, biology, sociology, logical games, decision theory, etc.), and their reflections in educational materials. The second part of the article introduces the issue of intransitivity in elementary physics. We present principles of building mechanical intransitive devices in correspondence with the structure of the Condorcet paradox, and describe five intransitive devices: intransitive gears; levers; pulleys, wheels, and axles; wedges; inclined planes. Each of the mechanisms are constructed as compositions of simple machines and show paradoxical intransitivity of relations such as “to rotate faster than”, “to lift”, “to be stronger than” in some geometrical constructions. The article is an invitation to develop teaching materials and problems advancing the understanding of transitivity and intransitivity in various areas, including physics education.

In the problem of aggregation of rankings or preferences of several agents, there is a well-known result that reasonable social ranking is not strategy-proof. In other words, there are some situations when at least one agent can submit insincere ranking and change the final result in a way beneficial to him. We call this situation manipulable and using computer modelling we study 10 majority relation-based collective decision rules and compare them by their degree of manipulability, i.e. by the share of the situation in which manipulation is possible. We found that there is no rule that is best for all possible cases but some rules like Fishburn rule, Minimal undominated set and Uncovered set II are among the least manipulable ones.

The majority of social and economic interactions take place between people of different social status. Age, position, income and other factors affect the way people evaluate their position in the society. We investigate how self-estimation of the social status is formed when an individual participates in an economic experimental game. In our experiment subjects are set in pairs and play consequently the dictator game, the trust game and the labor market (contract) game. After each game we measure their subjective socioeconomic status using two different scales. We show that participation in the dictator game affects the perception of one’s social status to the greatest extent: the status of dictators is higher than the status of recipients. Prescription of roles in other games does not have such an effect. Active behavior, gender, income, etc. also affect the subjective status.

The majority of social and economic interactions take place between people of different social status. Age, position, income and other factors affect the way people evaluate their position in the society. We investigate how self-estimation of the social status is formed when an individual participates in an economic experimental game. In our experiment subjects are set in pairs and play consequently the dictator game, the trust game and the labor market (contract) game. After each game we measure their subjective socioeconomic status using two different scales. We show that participation in the dictator game affects the perception of one's social status to the greatest extent: the status of dictators is higher than the status of recipients. Prescription of roles in other games does not have such an effect. Active behavior, gender, income, etc. also affect the subjective status.

The oil and gas industry growth has increased rapidly in the Barents Sea during the last few years. The Arctic zone is considered to be a relatively clean area. However, there is a certain number of “hot spots” in the Arctic due to the activities of extracting companies.

We study the problems connected with the production of these two types of fossil fuel and carried out simulation model. This model shows the results of oil or gas flowing accident related to drilling complex, taking into account sea currents, winds, temperature and ice. By using this model, we can highlight areas in the Barents Sea with the highest potential of the disaster so that preventive measures could be taken. In addition, this model helps to organize elimination of fossil fuel flowing consequences.

Ambiguity attitudes have been prominently used in economic models, but we still know little about their demographic correlates or their generalizability beyond the West. We analyze the ambiguity attitudes of almost 3,000 students across thirty countries. For gains, we find ambiguity aversion everywhere, while ambiguity aversion is much weaker for losses. Ambiguity attitudes change systematically with probabilities for both gains and losses. Much of the between-country variation can be explained through a few macroeconomic characteristics. In contrast, we find massive unexplained variation at the individual level. We also find much unexplained heterogeneity in individual responses to different decision tasks.

We use data on economic, management and political science journals to produce quan- titative estimates of (in)consistency of the evaluations based on six popular bibliometric indicators (impact factor, 5-year impact factor, immediacy index, article influence score, SNIP and SJR). We advocate a new approach to the aggregation of journal rankings. Since the rank aggregation is a multicriteria decision problem, ranking methods from social choice theory may solve it. We apply either a direct ranking method based on the majority rule (the Copeland rule, the Markovian method) or a sorting procedure based on a tournament solution, such as the uncovered set and the minimal externally stable set. We demonstrate that the aggregate rankings reduce the number of contradictions and represent the set of the single-indicator-based rankings better than any of the six rankings themselves.

This article discusses the trend in the development of testing from maximum regimentation of the test-takers’ activity (where they solve problems clearly formulated by the creator with a single correct answer) to diagnostic problematic situations that are very new and indefinite with an open beginning and an open end. With increasing frequency, the open beginning used in testing presupposes a freedom of independent formulation of one’s own research questions of the reality being studied and a search for answers while interacting with that reality. The emergence of mass testing of exploratory behavior is a reflection of the conviction that one of the key abilities that will be required in the very near future is the ability to cope with uncertainty and novelty, including by actively investigating them.

The discussion deals with the problems of testing intelligence and creativity in conditions of novelty and uncertainty, including the “judging problem.” It is pointed out that any thinking test, especially a test of creative thinking, is also an implicit (albeit perhaps not conscious) claim by its developers that their wisdom is virtually unsurpassed. After all, it is assumed that any person’s intelligence and creativity that unfold in a new situation may be described in the context of the model produced by the creative intellect of the test’s developer and, hence, by a more powerful “superintellect.” The errors that are practically inevitable with such an approach can be corrected in a dialog among various groups of researchers or, to the contrary, may be deepened if criticism is shut off.

The article analyzes a fundamental methodological error of creativity testing—the “standard list of creative answers” drawn up by the test-maker in advance, against which the participants’ solutions are checked. This error is explored in the case of an invention-oriented task in the international scholastic test PISA 2012, based on which the education ratings of countries are constructed.

An optimistic thesis is offered: no matter how successful testing is, humankind will never be fully prepared to determine its creative potential, due to its forward development. Without diagnostic tools, however, it will be far less prepared; they are a new and important part of that potential.

In the commentary to Jens Mammen’s book A New Logical Foundation for Psychology (2017), three issues are discussed. The first one concerns possible interrelations of: (a) others’ irreplaceability and existential irretrievability rigorously proved by Mammen; and (b) morality and attitudes to the others. Lem’s criticism of Heidegger’s existential philosophy, which paradoxically ignores mass homicide, is discussed in the context of topology of being. Different attitudes to the other as irreplaceable and irretrievable (e.g., in case of apprehension and execution of a murderer) are analyzed. The second issue concerns the possibility of true duplicates of the same person. The paradox of copied complexity is introduced. The third issue concerns reductionism (including brain reductionism) and opportunities to deduce various phenomena of development (mental development, actual genesis of creative thinking, etc.) from the new logical foundation for psychology built by Mammen.

We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly increasing utility functions that translate vote shares into payoffs. We find that if a strict Nash equilibrium exists in a model with an infinite number of voters, then nearby equilibria should exist for similar large, but finite, electorates. If the votes are independent random events, then equilibria will not depend on the utility functions of the candidates. Our results have implications for existing models of redistributive politics and spatial competition, as the properties of pure-strategy equilibria in such games carry over to equilibria in games with arbitrary candidate preferences. On the other hand, candidate utility functions will matter if the individual voting decisions are correlated. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, such as changing economic conditions or political scandals, the preferences of parties and candidates with respect to shares of votes will have an effect on political competition.

The majority of social and economic interactions take place between people of different social status. Age, position, income and other factors affect the way people evaluate their position in the society. We investigate how self-estimation of the social status is formed when an individual participates in an economic experimental game. In our experiment subjects are set in pairs and play consequently the dictator game, the trust game and the labor market (contract) game. After each game we measure their subjective socioeconomic status using two different scales. We show that participation in the dictator game affects the perception of one’s social status to the greatest extent: the status of dictators is higher than the status of recipients. Prescription of roles in other games does not have such an effect. Active behavior, gender, income, etc. also affect the subjective status.